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I Introduction
While trust in public institutions is a well established research eld in the political
science literature, trust in central banks is a eld where relatively little empirical
evidence exists. In economic terms, trust can be dened as "the belief or perception
by one party (e.g. a principal) that the other party (e.g. an agent) to a particular
transaction will not cheat" (Knack 2001). In the case of citizens and a central bank,
trust can be dened as a belief that the central bank, as the agent in a principal-agent
relationship, will deliver on its stated goals - in the case of the European Central Bank
(ECB) price stability - to its principal-citizens. There is little doubt that public trust
in policy-making institutions, not only central banks, is of fundamental importance
for their long-term success. This is even more so for independent central banks, which
ultimately derive their democratic legitimacy from the publics trust in them.
There is already a large literature emphasising how important trust is for economic
performance. Most of the literature has focused on interpersonal trust as being a key
determinant of economic growth.1 There is, however, also a literature on how higher
social cohesion and trust inuence the quality of public policies (e.g., Putnam 1993).
Moreover, interpersonal trust and condence in government are found to be positively
related (Knack and Keefer 1997). Trust in public institutions creates a positive payo¤
in terms of economic e¢ ciency: as citizens have to spend less time and e¤ort protecting
themselves from the possible poor functioning of institutions, they can devote more
resources to productive activities. If (especially high-prole) public institutions are
trusted and have a reputation for integrity, this can set a good example for the other
public institutions, as well as the private sector. In a nutshell, more trust leads to
better functioning public institutions.
That higher trust leads to better functioning institutions for the specic case of
central banks in particular. For example, central banks rely on announcements re-
garding how to interpret economic facts in order to steer expectations. How can one
believe these announcements and statements if one does not trust the institution?
Moreover, trust is needed because central banks particularly in crisis times are
granted delegation about decisions that the general public does not see, cannot moni-
tor and thus cannot judge. At times, such decisions need to be taken in a condential
way to be e¤ective. Trust in the central bank is what guarantees consensus to a non-
elected body and grants it freedom (for instance from political pressure) in making
this type of decisions. On the other hand, lack of trust weakens the central banks
and makes it vulnerable to political pressure (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2011). This
is why it is important to understand the determinants of trust in central banks.
Another eld in which public trust in central banks may prove important is for
the understanding of the formation of household ination expectations, which has
been the subject of a few studies recently (see Carroll 2003; Blanchower and Mac
1A classic reference here is North (1990).
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Coille 2009; and Easaw et al. 2010).2 Easaw et al. (2010), for example, is based
on Italian individual-level data and nds that individualslong-run ination expecta-
tions are consistently higher than the ECBs denition of price stability. This could
be consistent with an awarenesss of the ECBs denition and trust in it if Italian
ination was systematically deviating from the euro area average (Van der Cruijsen
and Demertzis 2011); however, given that on average Italian ination has been close
to the euro area average, this evidence suggests that respondents are either unaware
of the ECBs denition of price stability or do not trust the ECB to deliver on it.
If low public trust in central banks is associated with higher household ination ex-
pectations, then swings in public trust in the ECB also directly a¤ect its ability to
deliver on its mandate, though the empirical relevance of this proposition is yet to be
tested.
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the determinants of trust in the ECB
both in normal and crisis times, i.e. during the 2007-09 global nancial crisis and the
sovereign debt crisis in some euro area Member States, using individual-level data
from the European Commissions Eurobarometer survey. This is a survey conducted
at least twice a year covering around 27,000 individuals in 27 EU countries. We
look at trust behaviour, as measured by the survey, both in normal and crisis times.
Looking at crisis times is interesting in general, but it seems particularly so for a
currency union such as the euro area. Given the specic set-up of economic policies
within the euro area (with its centralised monetary policy and decentralised scal and
macroeconomic policies), a nancial crisis was always seen as the litmus test for the
existence and success of the euro even before the common currency was introduced.
The information contained in the Eurobarometer survey is therefore of great interest
and uniquely placed, also in an international perspective, in order to provide an
answer to these important questions.
There is as yet not much formal empirical evidence available on the e¤ect of the
crisis on public opinion. Stevenson and Wolfers (2011) document a fall in trust in
public institutions generally (both government and private) during the Great Reces-
sion, but do not investigate whether this reects the business cycle, as a similar fall
may have happened in other (though less severe) cyclical downturns. For Europe,
Roth (2009) notes an erosion of trust in European institutions, an increase in con-
dence in national institutions and the rise of strong anti-capitalist sentiments, but
does not explain them in relation to personal or country characteristics. Gros and
Roth (2010) match the Eurobarometer data on trust in the ECB, aggregated to the
country level, with macroeconomic data also during the nancial crisis, nding that
GDP growth appears to be an important determinant of trust in crisis times, but not
otherwise. Co¤ey and Hellwig (2011) study the e¤ect of the nancial crisis on the
British public opinion, using an original opinion survey conducted in November and
December 2008. They nd that perceptions of who is to blame for the crisis depend
2There is, of course, a larger literature on the e¤ect of central bank actions and policies on
nancial market ination expectations, which we do not touch upon here.
2
on education and political orientation; however, the scope of their analysis is quite
limited, in particular on economic issues. Hayo (2005) is an earlier reference for this
type of analysis for the Asian nancial crisis of 1998-99, using survey data from South
Korea.
For a rst look at the evolution of trust in the ECB, Figure 1 reports how re-
spondents in the euro area answered the Eurobarometer question "Please tell me if
you tend to trust the European Central Bank or not to trust it?". It is notable that
the ECB started with a very high level of trust right from the outset, with around
50% of respondents stating that they tend to trust the ECB, whereas only around
25% expressed a lack of trust. This is remarkable for a newly established institution.
This general tendency remained broadly unchanged until the global nancial crisis:
the share of those responding "no trust" in the ECB increased to above 40% in late
2008 and early 2009, and was, for the rst time, approximately equal to the share of
respondents who reported to trust the ECB. In the light of the pre-crisis variability
of the series, the evolution of the "no trust" answers in autumn 2008 represents a
ve standard deviations event. While there has been some recovery in trust in the
intermediate Eurobarometer surveys, the observation in the last survey that we cover
in our paper (spring 2010) is again over ve standard deviations above the pre-crisis
average for "no trust".
The decline in public trust in the ECB during the crisis might arguably also re-
ect a more general fall in trust in policy-making institutions, both at national and
supra-national level, and it is important to understand whether trust in the ECB and
other European institutions follows the same trend as national institutions. Figure
2 reports net trust in the ECB and other two European institutions (the European
Commission and the European Parliament) as well as the national government, the
national parliament and political parties. A rst issue to note is that trust in Eu-
ropean institutions, including the ECB, is consistently above trust in national gov-
ernments and parliaments, even during the crisis. While the reported trust clearly
follows a common trend for the European institutions, the decline in trust in the
ECB during the crisis was somewhat larger. Interestingly, net trust in national gov-
ernments, despite remaining below the ECB in terms of levels, has gone up, rather
than down, at the peak of the crisis in 2008.3 Subsequently, however, trust in national
governments falls drastically in the latest survey, probably reecting, at least in part,
the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and the accumulation of excessive public
debt.
Among central banks, the loss of trust during the crisis is not limited to the ECB:
Figure 3 reports results from a survey conducted by the Bank of England where it is
clearly visible how the share of those being "dissatised" with the Banks monetary
3Indeed, Roth et al. (2011) nd that trust in national institutions has actually increased in
the direct aftermath of the nancial crisis, in a rally-around-the-ag fashion. The EU institutions
have not been part of this positive e¤ect. After the peak of the crisis, however, trust in national
institutions is found to plunge again.
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policy rises sharply during the nancial crisis, mainly at the expense of the share of
those declaring themselves "satised" with it (note that the indicator is di¤erent from
the Eurobarometer measure of trust, due to the di¤erent structure of the survey).
To our knowledge, we are the rst to investigate the public trust in a central bank
both in normal and in crisis times using individual-level, as opposed to aggregate,
data. The availability of individual-level data allows us to control for the e¤ect of
di¤erent variables that inuence trust in the ECB and identify the marginal e¤ect
at the individual level. There are some other papers analysing the public attitude
towards the euro based on individual-level Eurobarometer data (e.g. Banducci et al.
2009), but none of them focuses on the trust in the ECB nor on the very special
circumstances of the global nancial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in some euro
area member states in 2010. Van der Cruijsen and Eij¢ nger (2008) report on a
survey of Dutch households on the perceived transparency of the ECB. They nd
that trust in the ECB and perceived transparency are positively correlated. Mosch
and Prast (2008), in a comprehensive study of trust in the Netherlands, also provide
a micro-level data analysis of trust in the Dutch central bank. Finally, Kaltenthaler
et al. (2010) use the micro data from one single Eurobarometer wave to test whether
trust in the ECB is related to the perception of respondents that they cannot control
the institution. Turning to papers using macro level data and variables, Fischer
and Volker (2008) study the determinants of trust in the ECB using country-level
information from the Eurobarometer survey, nding that higher ination reduces
trust.
Against this background, in this paper we contemplate and test three, not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, hypotheses for the fall in public trust in the ECB associated
with the global nancial crisis. First, it could be that the fall in trust in the ECB
is explained by economic developments (henceforth the Economy Hypothesis). Since
the central bank is an important economic policy actor, the global nancial crisis and
the associated economic contraction are likely to reduce the central banks popularity
in the public opinion. Second, it is possible that the global nancial crisis has exposed
European policy makerslimitations in preventing and solving global problems and
the trust in the ECB has su¤ered because it is a European institution (the Europe
Hypothesis). Third, as the banking sector was at the epicentre of the global nancial
crisis, its problems may have negatively impacted trust in the ECB through several
channels: either the ECB is (perceived to be) a "bank", or it is (wrongly) assumed
to have direct supervisory and regulatory responsibilities for the banking sector, or,
nally, its actions are seen as implying some form of bail-out of the nancial sector
which was seen as undeserved or inappropriate in the public opinion (henceforth the
Banks Hypothesis). Any further loss in the trust in the ECB that is not explained by
the factors just mentioned could, in our view, only be attributable to a loss of trust
in the euro (area) itself.
We try to come up with testable implications of the three hypotheses and we
conclude, from the empirical analysis, that all of them appear to have played a role.
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Hence, the fall in the public trust in the ECB in crisis times can be explained by
a combination of (i) the large and abrupt economic contraction due to the nancial
crisis, (ii) a generalised loss of condence in Europe and European institutions, and
(iii) the fact that the ECB is somehow associated to the banking sector in the public
opinion, either as a supervisor and regulator or because its policies were seen as a
bail-out of the banking sector. Importantly, we nd that these determinants are
able to explain the fall in trust during the crisis entirely, using essentially the same
elasticities estimated in the pre-crisis period. In other words, the crisis has brought
no fundamental change in the way economic agents form trust in the ECB.
Our results also imply that we do not nd any "euro-specic" residual loss in trust
to be explained, i.e. loss in trust in the euro (area) itself. Indeed, the Eurobarometer
surveys shows that, between 2003 and the autumn of 2009, public support for the euro
has consistently uctuated around 60%, with no noticeable crisis impact. The fall in
the trust in the ECB during the crisis is therefore not associated in a fall in trust
in the ECB as the central bank of the euro area specically. This is consistent with
the high credibility as an ination ghter that the ECB has maintained in nancial
markets during both the global nancial crisis of 2007-09 and during the European
sovereign debt crisis.
Another important result of this paper is the observed nexus between knowledge
about the ECB and trust in it. We show that not only does a higher degree of
knowledge lead to a higher degree of trust on average, but also in particular during
the global nancial crisis. This result suggests that the ECB, and central banks more
generally, should invest more in getting themselves known to the general public, for
example by using more intensely communication channels especially targeted at the
general public.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the data used in the
study. Section III presents the empirical model and Section IV the results for the
euro area countries. Section V examines the role of public knowledge of the ECB
in determining the trust in it, both in normal times and during the crisis. Section
VI looks at some issues related to the design of the Eurobarometer survey. Section
VII looks at the trust in the ECB in the non-euro area countries, which might have
di¤erent determinants than in euro area countries. Section VIII concludes.
II Data
This study is based on data from the Eurobarometer survey, a large cross-national
individual-level survey performed on behalf of the European Commission since 1973.
The standard Eurobarometer surveys are conducted twice a year, in the spring and in
the autumn. Each survey consists of around 1,000 face-to-face interviews per member
state (around 2,000 in Germany, 600 in Luxembourg and 1,300 in the United King-
dom), up to a total of over 27,000 individuals in the whole EU. The eldwork normally
straddles two months, for example the autumn survey is conducted in October and
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November.4 Note that the survey is not a panel, i.e. the subjects are changed in each
iteration. Therefore, it is not possible to control for individual xed e¤ects, which is
a key advantage of the longitudinal data. On the other hand, the true sample size is
larger since di¤erent individuals are sampled in each survey.
Since we want to ensure a consistent set of variables in the surveys, in our empiri-
cal analysis we only rely on data from the biannual standard Eurobarometer surveys,
up to the rst survey of 2010. However, we also draw data from the special Euro-
barometer survey "Europeans and the economic crisis" conducted in mid-January to
mid-February 2009.5
In addition to the individual-level data from the Eurobarometer survey we also
include a number of macroeconomic variables at the country level. These include
annual HICP ination and the unemployment rate, from Eurostat; total monthly
stock returns and monthly bank stock returns, from Datastream; and an indicator of
Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of the nancial sector (median across nancial
institutions in each country), compiled by the ECB based on Moodys data on indi-
vidual institutions. The macroeconomic data are integrated into the biannual survey
data in the following way: we assume that the relevant observation is the average
value of the variable in the six months before the eldwork is conducted. For exam-
ple, stock returns are the average monthly stock returns between month t   7 and
month t   1, if t is the month when the eldwork is conducted. An overview of the
precise denitions of all variables is provided in the data appendix table.
The sample period for our analysis is 1999-2010. Table 1 reports some descriptive
statistics of the individual-level and macroeconomic data that we use in our esti-
mations. We have around 178,000 individual-level observations in our sample for the
euro area (around 140,000 in the pre-crisis period and 38,000 in the crisis period); the
average age of the respondents is 45 years, with a (slight) majority of male, married
and employed individuals.
Table 2 reports summary statistics specically for the "trust in the ECB" variable.
In the full sample, 63% of respondents report to trust the ECB, while 29% report not
to trust it, and 8% give no answer. Gender, age, marital status, working status and
especially education and political orientation appear to matter for trust in the ECB.
For example, while only 56% of respondents without a high school degree report to
trust the ECB, this percentage rises to 70% for respondents with a University degree.
4Importantly for our paper, the eldwork for the autumn 2008 survey was carried out between
6 October and 6 November 2008, which coincides with the most acute phase of the global nancial
crisis.
5Note that we take the survey data from the "Mannheim EB Trendle" maintained by the
Leibnitz Institut fur Sozialwissenschaften up to 2002, and we integrate the post-2002 data. The last
Eurobarometer data covered in this paper are those of Eurobarometer 73.4 (conducted in Spring
2010).
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III The empirical model
We estimate the following probit model,
trustjit = x
j
it + z
j
t + crisist + v
j
it  crisist + "jit (1)
where trustjit is the binary variable capturing trust in the ECB, at time t for individual
i in country j, xjit is a vector of individual-specic variables (such as gender, age,
political a¢ liation), zjt is a vector of country-level variables (such as ination and
the unemployment rate), crisist is a dummy variable capturing the global nancial
crisis6 and vjit is a subset of [x
j
it; z
j
t ] that we let interact with the crisis dummy, in
order to understand the mechanisms through which the crisis has propagated to the
public opinion. Note that, in this baseline version of the analysis, we only estimate
the model for euro area countries, since the ECB is the central bank of these countries
only.7 Later on, we also look at the pre-ins, i.e. the EU countries which have (still)
not adopted the euro as their currency.
In order to control for selection bias, we apply the Heckman correction procedure,
for two reasons. First, the number of individuals taking part in the Eurobarometer
surveys expressing no opinion on trust in the ECB is non-negligible, at around 8%
of "dont know" answers across the full sample. If the decision to form an opinion
is not random, this might introduce a bias in the estimated coe¢ cients. Second, the
number of respondents expressing an opinion rises during the crisis and the share of
"dont know" answers falls to less than 5%, potentially further biasing the estimation
of a standard probit model.
The Heckman procedure corrects the bias introduced by sample selection by treat-
ing the latter as an omitted variable problem. The procedure involves a two-stage
estimation method. In the rst stage (selection), the probability of being included in
the sample (in our application the decision of the respondent to provide an opinion
on the ECB) is estimated by way of a probit model. In the second stage (option), the
respondentsopinion about the ECB is modelled, where the estimated probabilities
from the rst stage are included in the full model as explanatory variables.8 Also
the second stage model is in the form of a probit specication. As an identication
device, we estimate the probability of expressing an opinion on the ECB based on
whether the respondent has expressed an opinion on the European Parliament. This
is based on the assumption that the decision to express an opinion on the European
Parliament is relatively independent of whether the respondent trusts, or does not
trust, the ECB (second stage of the Heckman probit model). We nd indeed that
this variable is highly relevant to explain the decision to provide an answer, which is
6The crisis dummy is taken to be 1 for the Eurobarometer surveys in autumn 2008 onwards and
0 otherwise. Later on, we also provide some robustness analysis by considering a di¤erent denition.
7In the baseline exercise we consider the euro area in changing composition, including a country
as soon as it adopts the euro.
8See Puhani (2000).
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not at all surprising since trust in the European Parliament is part of the same set of
questions.9
Operationally, we start from the model estimated in normal times, i.e. on the
pre-crisis sample. This gives us a benchmark model upon which we subsequently
investigate the behaviour of trust in the ECB during crisis times. A fully successful
explanation of the fall in the trust in the ECB in the wake of the global nancial
crisis would require that  =  = 0, i.e. that the behaviour of the trust variable is
entirely explained by the variables in [xjit; z
j
t ], with the same elasticities as during the
pre-crisis period. If  = 0 but  6= 0 ; then the model points to a change of behaviour
of the public opinion during the crisis period compared with normal times.
We estimate the model without correcting for survey weights. A robustness test
(not reported here for brevity) shows that a weighted estimation does not a¤ect the
results in any signicant fashion, which is to be expected given that the survey design
of the Eurobarometer is relatively standard. All results reported in the paper refer
to marginal e¤ects, and we only report the overall e¤ects of a given variable on trust
in the ECB, i.e. taking account of a possible e¤ect of a variable in both the selection
and the option stage of the Heckman model.
IV Results for the euro area
Table 3 reports the results of the model in the pre-crisis period, i.e. until the spring
2008 survey, in the euro area in changing composition (about 121,000 observations).
Results indicate that respondents are more likely to trust the ECB if they are male,
older, married, with higher education and have a centre-right political orientation.10
A higher satisfaction with life is also associated with higher trust in the ECB. Because
the ECB is an EU institution as well as due to the design of the survey, which groups
together the questions on trust in European institutions, we can expect a tight link
with trust in other EU institutions, and in fact we nd a strong association with
trust in the European Commission. More pro-European citizens also trust the ECB
more, as shown by the positive coe¢ cient associated to a¢ rmative responses to the
question "EU membership is a good thing". At the country level, we nd that lower
9Even though we nd that the Heckman procedure is warranted (e.g., the inverse mills ratio in
the second stage is estimated to be statistically signicant), a robustness test where we disregard
all "dont know" answers and estimate a simple probit model for the remaining observations shows
that our results are qualitatively robust.
10It is interesting to compare our results with those of Easaw et al. (2010) on household ination
expectations. We nd that older, highly educated individuals have more trust in the ECB, and they
nd that they have lower expected ination (see Table 1, page 26 in their paper). This somehow
suggests that trust and expected ination may be negatively correlated at the individual level, as
may be expected. Our results are also consistent with those of Mosch and Prast (2008) on the trust
in Netherlands central bank, the DNB. In particular, they nd that trust in the DNB is higher
for older and male individuals, with a more optimistic stance and a higher trust in the national
parliament.
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stock returns and higher ination and unemployment are negatively related to trust
in the ECB, while measures of the health of the nancial system (the EDF and the
excess return on bank stocks over the whole stock market) are insignicant in normal
times, as could have been expected.11
In Table 4 we turn to analyse the behaviour of the trust variable also in crisis
times, expanding the sample up to the spring 2010 survey. Starting with the rst
column, we observe that the crisis leads to a strong and statistically signicant fall in
trust in the ECB, of about 7%, in line with the visual inspection of Figure 1. Hence,
the crisis in itself had a signicant downward impact on trust in the ECB. In the
remainder of the table we endeavour to explain why. In the second column we add
the demographic variables (and will retain them from thereon), in the third column
the economic variables, in the fourth column the variables which relate to attitudes
towards Europe and European institutions, and in the fth column the variables
capturing the health (or lack thereof) of the nancial sector (EDF of the nancial
sector and excess returns on bank stocks). We nd that, individually, none of these
factors are able to explain away the crisis dummy. However, when included together
(sixth column), we nd that the crisis dummy is eventually insignicant ( = 0). In
order to test whether also  = 0 (determinants of trust in the ECB are the same in
normal and crisis times) we add the interaction terms in the last column of Table
4. We nd that, compared with normal times, in crisis times (i) the sensitivity to
ination is lower, but it is larger for ination perceptions; (ii) the trust in the other
European institutions (the European Commission in particular) matters a bit less,
and (iii) excess bank stock returns matter in crisis periods, and not otherwise. Just
how important are these di¤erences between normal and crisis times to explain the
fall in trust in the ECB during the crisis? Very little, it turns out. We conduct
an "out-of-sample" analysis whereby trust in the ECB is regressed, over the whole
sample, on the crisis dummy, taking the coe¢ cients in  and  at their pre-crisis
values:
trustjit = bxjit + bzjt + crisist + "jit (2)
where the superscript "b" indicates that the coe¢ cients are imposed and not esti-
mated. If there was an economically signicant change in behaviour between normal
and crisis times, this would show up in a statistically signicant coe¢ cient . How-
ever (test not reported for brevity) we nd this not to be the case: the  coe¢ cient
is insignicant, indicating that the pre-crisis model does a good job in explaining the
behaviour of trust in crisis times. Overall, this evidence suggests that, by and large,
a change in the elasticities was not a fundamental factor in determining the loss of
trust in the ECB during the crisis. Hence, we nd that the pre-crisis regularities and
11We also included additional macroeconomic variables (industrial production growth, private
consumption growth, consumer condence, real GDP growth) but these were all statistically in-
signicant.
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the evolution of the macroeconomy are su¢ cient to explain the deterioration of trust
in the ECB during the crisis.
We also conducted a number of robustness checks on the baseline results reported
in Table 4 (not reported here for brevity). In particular, our results are qualitatively
robust when estimating the models for the euro area in xed composition (euro-12,
i.e. the sample only contains observations for those 12 countries that have been euro
area members since at least 2001), when we change the denition of the crisis dummy
(starting from the autumn 2007 Eurobarometer survey wave rather than from autumn
2008) and when including country xed e¤ects.
V The role of knowledge of the ECB to explain
trust
An important variable that might a¤ect the degree of trust in the ECB, as indeed
in any other European or domestic institution, is the individual level of knowledge
about it. It is of course di¢ cult to trust an institution whose main characteristics are
not well known. In the Eurobarometer survey, the following question is asked: "Have
you heard about the ECB?" where possible answers are "Yes" and "No". About 85%
of respondents report to have heard about the ECB, while a minority of about 15%
has not. It turns out, however, that these 15% express a considerably lower level of
trust in the ECB than those who say that they have heard about it.
Asking people who report not to have heard about the ECB prior to the survey
about their level of trust in the institution might at rst sight seem nonsensical,
and one might ask whether these answers should be used in our estimations at all.
On the one hand, it should be assumed that economic agents who have never heard
about the ECB take their economic decisions and form perceptions without trust
in the ECB being a relevant factor at all. On the other hand, the answer to this
survey question might still be relevant, for a number of reasons. First, participation
in the Eurobarometer survey imparts knowledge about the existence of the ECB.
Second, even if the respondent had not previously developed an explicit opinion
about the ECB, a spontaneous answer is very likely to reect a general attitude
of the respondent, which in turn a¤ects his or her behaviour. Third, the fact that a
substantial part of the population does not know the ECB, yet reports lower trust
in the institution, is still important from a public policy point of view. It strongly
suggests that the ECB should enhance its communication e¤orts so as to increase
public knowledge about and trust in itself, so as to improve its ability to steer ination
expectations. Finally, in practice, there is a continuum of degree of knowledge, from
knowing nothing at all, to being fully and perfectly informed.
The knowledge variable was not included in the baseline analysis due to limited
data availability, but some results are reported in this section. Table 5 clearly illus-
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trates that trust in the ECB is much higher among those who have previously heard
about it: individuals who know the ECB are 30% more likely to trust it. Moreover,
the loss of trust has been signcantly lower among respondents who report to have
heard about the ECB. We also repeat the baseline estimation only for those respon-
dents who report to know the ECB, and nd that results are very similar to the
benchmark model.12
These results have clear important implications for central bank communication,
as they suggest that the best way to strengthen trust, also during a nancial crisis, is
to increase the publics knowledge about the central bank itself and its policies. While
there is an enormous literature in other domains of central bank communication (see
Blinder et al. 2008 for a survey), the role of communication with and to the general
public is a very under-researched eld, no doubt due to data limitations. This is
likely to apply with particular force to the ECB and the euro area, with its plurality
of languages and cultures.13
In most models used for monetary policy analysis, the private sector is presented
as an indistinct representative agent who has a very good understanding of the macro-
economic environment and of the central bank policies. The degree of transparency
and communication by a central bank is typically either on its current assessment of
macroeconomic conditions or on the policies that the central banks intends to pursue
in the future (see, e.g., Woodford 2005). That may be rather far from the truth for
the household sector. Van der Cruijsen et al. (2010) have conducted a survey amonng
Dutch households about their degree of knowledge of the ECB. Their main result is
that the public has limited knowledge about the ECB. Indeed, the average number
of correct answers to eleven straightforward statements about the ECBs objectives
is less than ve; for example, many respondents think that the ECBs ination tar-
get applies to individual countries, rather than the euro area as a whole. Van der
Cruijsen et al. also report that many individuals have a rather weak desire to be
informed about the central bank, and this is an important barrier for central bank
communication. Nevertheless, clear and comprehensible messages should contribute
to making the ECB, and other central banks, better known to the general public.
VI Issues in the Eurobarometer survey design
As mentioned earlier, a key characteristic of the Eurobarometer survey that could be
important for the purposes of our study is the fact that the question on trust in the
ECB is lumped together with questions on trust in other European institutions. It
may therefore become automatic to give a collective answer to the trust questions,
unless a respondent really has a strong view of any particular institution. There is
12We dont report results for the "ECB not known" sample since we have too few observations to
meaningfully estimate the model.
13See Padoa-Schioppa (2004).
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no easy way to overcome this problem, but we attempt to correct it at least to some
extent in Table 6. There, we exclude those respondents who have given exactly the
same answer (group answer) for all European institutions that are covered in the Eu-
robarometer survey (Commission, Parliament, ECB, Ombudsman, Court of Justice,
Council of Ministers). Note that two thirds of all respondents fall into this category,
as the number of observations drops from around 180,000 to just above 60,000. This
suggests that the survey design is a potentially serious matter. However, rather re-
assuringly, results are remarkably consistent with the baseline analysis. Predictably,
the coe¢ cient on trust in the European Commission goes down signicantly, although
it remains positive and signicant. Moreover, the coe¢ cient for the EDF of the nan-
cial sector becomes negative in crisis times only. In spite of these reassuring results,
however, the survey design issue represents an important caveat to our analysis, sug-
gesting that the way the Eurobarometer phrases its questions puts the respondent in
a frame of mind where he or she is concerned with a general notion of Europe. This
makes it di¢ cult to di¤erentiate between various individual European institutions.
VII Trust in the ECB in non-euro area member
states
So far, we have looked at trust in the ECB in euro area members, since the ECB is the
central bank of the euro area. Nonetheless, it may also be interesting to look at trust
in other EU countries, not least because most of these countries are expected, sooner
or later, to join the euro area and therefore to have the ECB as their own central
bank. In these countries, it is possible that what matters in terms of trust in the
ECB is not the absolute economic performance of the country of the respondent but
also the performance of the euro area and the comparison between the two (relative
performance). For example, individuals in a country with higher ination than the
euro area may trust the ECBmore because its performance is better than that of their
own central bank. Therefore, we expand our specication to include not only the euro
area macroeconomic variables, but also the di¤erentials between the country and the
euro area. If the di¤erential receives a positive coe¢ cient, say for the ination rate,
this implies that citizens in countries with higher ination have higher trust in the
ECB because the ination performance of the euro area is better than the national
performance.
Table 7 reports the regression results for the euro area (based on our prefered
specication, namely column (6) of Table 4), the whole set of non-euro area member
states, the oldnon-euro area member states and the newnon-euro area member
states (i.e. member states which joined the EU from 2004 onwards), since the de-
terminants might be di¤erent across the two groups. Many of the determinants are
the same as in the euro area countries, in particular the demographic factors and the
variables capturing the attitudes towards Europe (trust in the European Commission
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and the assessment of whether EU membership is a good thing). This is particularly
true for the old EU member states, while respondents in the new member states are
somewhat di¤erent and variables are generally less statistically signicant. In the old
non-euro area member states, euro area ination is positively signed but ination in
the country is insignicant. The ination perception and unemployment di¤erentials
are negatively signed, suggesting that what matters for citizenstrust is the country
performance rather than the relative performance vs. the euro area. In new member
states, we nd support for the relative performance concept for HICP ination, but
not for ination perceptions. Overall, the hypothesis that the ECB would be more
trusted the worse national economic performance relative to the euro area is thus gen-
erally not supported by the data. The nancial sector variables are wrongly signed,
in particular in the old non-euro area member states, where a healthier nancial sec-
tor in the country leads to less, not more trust in the ECB. This is also consistent
with the crisis dummy variable, which is signicant and positive in old non-euro area
member states.
VIII Conclusions
This paper has analysed the evolution and determinants of public opinion towards
the ECB during normal and crisis times. We rst establish some stylised facts on the
public trust in the ECB in pre-crisis times. We nd that demographic factors, the
economy (in particular the unemployment rate) and the attitude towards Europe and
European institutions (the latter possibly inuenced by the design of the survey) are
all important determinants of trust in the ECB.
Subsequently, the paper focuses on explaining the abrupt and sharp fall in the
public trust in the ECB during the nancial crisis. We nd that the fall in public
trust in the ECB during the crisis can be well explained by a combination of three
e¤ects: (i) the sharp deterioration in the economic situation during the crisis, (ii) the
overall fall in public trust in the European project during the crisis, possibly because
citizens saw Europe as being unable to prevent or solve the global crisis, and (iii) the
fact that the ECB was associated, in the public opinion, to the troubles of the nancial
sector. These three factors are needed jointly for a satisfactory explanation. While
the impact of the third factor appears to be partly specic to the crisis, the impact of
the rst two appear to matter in approximately the same way both in normal times
and during the crisis. A main nding of our paper is that the fall in public trust in
the ECB is therefore very well described based on the pre-crisis elasticities and the
macroeconomic outcomes. We conclude, therefore, that the loss of trust in the ECB
reects the fact that the ECB is viewed as an important economic policy actor, as
European and as a bank. Being the central bank of the euro area did not, by itself,
exert a specic impact on the public trust in it during crisis times.
We also shed light on the important role played by the degree of knowledge of the
ECB in inuencing trust in it. Indeed, respondents who are su¢ ciently aware of the
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ECB reported not only higher trust, but also a relatively smaller fall in trust during
the nancial crisis. It appears, therefore, that our study has a straightforward policy
implication, namely that central banks such as the ECB should make themselves
better known among the general public, to increase the publics trust in them, both
in normal and crisis times. As mentioned by Blinder et al. (2008), communication to
the general public is an under-researched and yet fascinating area for future research.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics for euro area countries 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust in ECB 164099 0.680 0.466 0.000 1.000 128392 0.698 0.459 0.000 1.000 35707 0.617 0.486 0.000 1.000
Gender: female 178028 0.488 0.500 0.000 1.000 140533 0.487 0.500 0.000 1.000 37495 0.492 0.500 0.000 1.000
Age 178028 45.072 17.877 0.000 99.000 140533 44.772 17.843 0.000 99.000 37495 46.199 17.961 15.000 97.000
Married 178028 0.600 0.490 0.000 1.000 140533 0.606 0.489 0.000 1.000 37495 0.578 0.494 0.000 1.000
Educational attainment 178028 2.001 0.774 1.000 3.000 140533 1.980 0.776 1.000 3.000 37495 2.079 0.759 1.000 3.000
Employed 178028 0.524 0.499 0.000 1.000 140533 0.529 0.499 0.000 1.000 37495 0.506 0.500 0.000 1.000
Retired 178028 0.216 0.411 0.000 1.000 140533 0.210 0.407 0.000 1.000 37495 0.239 0.427 0.000 1.000
Political orientation 178028 -0.056 0.528 -1.000 1.000 140533 -0.053 0.526 -1.000 1.000 37495 -0.067 0.536 -1.000 1.000
Total stock returns 178028 -0.260 3.578 -12.757 8.678 140533 -0.117 2.752 -7.710 5.140 37495 -0.796 5.664 -12.757 8.678
HICP inflation 178028 2.331 1.211 -1.308 5.587 140533 2.410 0.985 0.016 5.587 37495 2.035 1.795 -1.308 5.278
Inflation perceptions 178028 36.947 22.623 -24.683 80.733 140533 36.055 20.754 -24.683 76.533 37495 40.297 28.324 -21.733 80.733
Unemployment rate 178028 7.331 2.473 2.548 18.246 140533 7.297 2.339 2.548 12.423 37495 7.461 2.919 3.032 18.246
General satisfaction with life 178028 3.023 0.715 1.000 4.000 140533 3.038 0.705 1.000 4.000 37495 2.964 0.750 1.000 4.000
Trust in the European Commission 178028 0.659 0.474 0.000 1.000 140533 0.673 0.469 0.000 1.000 37495 0.607 0.488 0.000 1.000
EU membership is a good thing 178028 0.461 0.748 -1.000 1.000 140533 0.480 0.730 -1.000 1.000 37495 0.390 0.806 -1.000 1.000
Expected default frequency 178028 0.310 1.801 0.010 25.677 140533 0.121 0.122 0.010 0.908 37495 1.020 3.838 0.013 25.677
Excess return of bank stocks 178028 0.265 2.882 -10.445 15.686 140533 0.220 1.675 -7.124 8.582 37495 0.433 5.380 -10.445 15.686
Heard of ECB 135342 0.844 0.363 0.000 1.000 106963 0.834 0.372 0.000 1.000 28379 0.880 0.325 0.000 1.000
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis
 
Note: The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables employed in this paper. For details on data sources and definitions, see data appendix. Full sample period from 1999 (autumn 
survey) to 2010 (spring survey); pre-crisis sample period from 1999 (autumn survey) to 2008 (spring survey); crisis sample period from 2008 (autumn survey) to 2010 (spring survey).  
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TABLE 2. Summary statistics on trust in the ECB 
 
 
Total
Female Male <=30 31-45 46-60 >60 Not married Married <16 16 - 19 >19
Unem-
ployed
Em-
ployed
Not 
retired Retired Left Center Right
Trust 62.8 65.3 60.1 64.4 63.3 62.4 60.6 61.2 63.8 56.6 61.9 70.0 61.7 63.7 63.5 59.9 58.9 63.4 64.7
No trust 29.5 28.3 30.7 27.0 29.5 30.4 31.2 30.4 28.8 34.4 30.1 23.7 30.1 29.0 28.8 32.1 33.6 28.7 28.6
Don't know 7.8 6.4 9.2 8.6 7.2 7.2 8.3 8.4 7.4 9.0 8.0 6.3 8.3 7.3 7.7 8.0 7.6 8.0 6.8
Trust 63.8 66.1 61.4 65.6 64.2 63.7 61.4 62.3 64.8 58.3 63.2 70.6 62.3 65.2 64.6 60.9 59.7 64.5 65.2
No trust 27.6 26.8 28.4 25.0 27.8 28.4 29.5 28.4 27.1 31.9 27.9 22.6 28.4 26.9 26.9 30.3 31.9 26.7 27.4
Don't know 8.6 7.0 10.2 9.4 8.0 7.9 9.2 9.3 8.1 9.8 8.9 6.8 9.3 7.9 8.5 8.8 8.4 8.8 7.4
Trust 58.8 62.0 55.4 59.2 59.7 58.2 57.9 57.2 59.9 48.9 57.2 68.2 59.6 58.0 59.5 56.6 55.8 59.0 62.4
No trust 36.5 34.0 39.0 35.5 36.2 37.4 36.9 37.5 35.7 46.1 38.0 27.3 36.0 37.0 36.0 38.1 39.4 36.3 33.3
Don't know 4.7 3.9 5.6 5.3 4.2 4.4 5.2 5.2 4.4 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.6 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.3
Full 
sample
Pre-crisis
Crisis
Gender Working status Political orientationAge Marital status Education until age Employment status
Note: The table reports summary statistics on trust in the ECB, as reported in the Eurobarometer survey by euro area respondents. Numbers are in percentages. Sample period from 1999 
(autumn survey) to 2010 (spring survey). Data reported are percentages.  
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TABLE 3: Determinants of trust in the ECB 
(euro area changing composition, pre-crisis period) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender: female -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Age -0.000 -0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.028*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Educational attainment 0.051*** 0.042*** 0.026*** 0.051*** 0.018***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Employed 0.001 -0.000 0.014*** 0.001 0.007**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Retired -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005)
Political orientation 0.033*** 0.027** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.028***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007)
Total stock returns -0.001 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
HICP inflation 0.015 -0.021**
(0.010) (0.010)
Inflation perceptions 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Unemployment rate -0.012** -0.018***
(0.006) (0.006)
General satisfaction with life 0.095*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.005)
Trust in the European Commission 0.605*** 0.613***
(0.040) (0.039)
EU membership is a good thing 0.098*** 0.098***
(0.010) (0.007)
Expected default frequency -0.037 0.083
(0.078) (0.062)
Excess return of bank stocks -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.005)
AIC 206248 203081 154425 206180 152864
BIC 206355 203197 154532 206287 152981
# of observations 121217 121217 121217 121217 121217
# of censored observations 10763 10763 10763 10763 10763
Log likelihood -103113 -101528 -77202 -103079 -76420
chi-squared for comparison test 2.077 1.753 28.290 2.055 12.405
p-value for comparison test 0.150 0.185 0.000 0.152 0.000  
Note: The table reports the determinants of trust in the ECB in the euro area (changing composition), estimated 
using equation (1). Sample period from 1999 (autumn survey) to 2008 (spring survey). Coefficients report 
marginal effects from Heckman probit regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. *, 
** and *** denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 4: Determinants of trust in the ECB 
(euro area changing composition, full sample period) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crisis dummy -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.051** -0.047** -0.068*** -0.033 -0.050
(0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.108)
Gender: female -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.038***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Educational attainment 0.069*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.069*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Employed -0.004 -0.006 0.007* -0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Retired -0.006 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.010*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
Political orientation 0.035*** 0.027** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.026***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Total stock returns 0.003*** 0.002 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
HICP inflation 0.020** 0.002 -0.017*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Inflation perceptions -0.001 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate -0.011** -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
General satisfaction with life 0.098*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
Trust in the European Commission 0.596*** 0.603*** 0.616***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.037)
EU membership is a good thing 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.091***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008)
Expected default frequency -0.004** -0.003* 0.093
(0.002) (0.002) (0.070)
Excess return of bank stocks -0.000 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Interaction terms with crisis dummy
Total stock returns -0.002
(0.004)
HICP inflation 0.053***
(0.015)
Inflation perceptions -0.002**
(0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.002
(0.009)
General satisfaction with life -0.002
(0.009)
Trust in the European Commission -0.042**
(0.019)
EU membership is a good thing -0.004
(0.007)
Expected default frequency -0.094
(0.070)
Excess return of bank stocks 0.007*
(0.004)
AIC 301213 297991 293135 223569 297958 221076 220503
BIC 301273 298112 293266 223700 298079 221197 220635
# of observations 178028 178028 178028 178028 178028 178028 178028
# of censored observations 13929 13929 13929 13929 13929 13929 13929
Log likelihood -150600 -148984 -146554 -111771 -148967 -110526 -110239
chi-squared for comparison test 1.045 1.931 1.098 36.084 1.850 13.675 6.213
p-value for comparison test 0.307 0.165 0.295 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.013  
Note: The table reports the determinants of trust in the ECB in the euro area (changing composition), estimated 
using equation (1). Sample period from 1999 (autumn survey) to 2010 (spring survey). Coefficients report 
marginal effects from Heckman probit regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. *, 
** and *** denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 5: The effect of the crisis and prior knowledge about the ECB on trust 
 
(1) (2)
Heard of ECB 0.305*** 0.290***
(0.036) (0.034)
Crisis dummy -0.096***
(0.020)
Heard of ECB interacted with crisis dummy 0.063***
(0.022)
AIC 212628 212218
BIC 212687 212316
# of observations 135342 135342
# of censored observations 9607 9607
Log likelihood -106,308 -106,099
chi-squared for comparison test 0.263 0.425
p-value for comparison test 0.608 0.514
 
Note: The table reports the determinants of trust in the ECB in the euro area (changing composition) as a function 
of prior knowledge about the ECB. Sample period from 1999 (autumn survey) to 2010 (spring survey). 
Coefficients report marginal effects from Heckman probit regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at 
the country level. *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 6: Determinants of trust in the ECB 
(euro area changing composition, sub-sample of individuals who express different 
levels of trust in EU institutions) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crisis dummy -0.070* -0.072** -0.088*** -0.032* -0.070* -0.047 -0.073
(0.039) (0.036) (0.030) (0.018) (0.036) (0.029) (0.137)
Gender: female -0.046** -0.038** -0.059*** -0.046** -0.051*** -0.045***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013)
Age 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.019** 0.006 0.020*** 0.018** 0.009 0.006
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Educational attainment 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.037*** 0.033***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
Employed 0.014 0.009 0.021*** 0.014 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
Retired 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.005
(0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Political orientation 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.033** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
Total stock returns -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HICP inflation -0.010 -0.022 -0.034**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Inflation perceptions -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate -0.022** -0.025*** -0.028***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
General satisfaction with life 0.067*** 0.052*** 0.051***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Trust in the European Commission 0.157*** 0.181*** 0.199***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.022)
EU membership is a good thing 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.083***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Expected default frequency -0.003 -0.003 0.192**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.086)
Excess return of bank stocks -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006)
Interaction terms with crisis dummy
Total stock returns -0.001
(0.005)
HICP inflation 0.065**
(0.027)
Inflation perceptions -0.002
(0.001)
Unemployment rate -0.003
(0.013)
General satisfaction with life 0.008
(0.013)
Trust in the European Commission -0.058***
(0.022)
EU membership is a good thing 0.004
(0.012)
Expected default frequency -0.193**
(0.085)
Excess return of bank stocks 0.008
(0.006)
AIC 119438 117879 116109 113632 117855 111939 111583
BIC 119493 117988 116226 113740 117963 112048 111701
# of observations 62433 62433 62433 62433 62433 62433 62433
# of censored observations 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057
Log likelihood -59713 -58928 -58041 -56804 -58915 -55958 -55779
chi-squared for comparison test 0.285 1.070 0.438 6.036 1.061 4.108 2.521
p-value for comparison test 0.593 0.301 0.508 0.014 0.303 0.043 0.112  
Note: The table reports the determinants of trust in the ECB in the euro area (changing composition), estimated 
using equation (1), but excluding respondents who answered the question about trust in all European institutions in 
the same fashion. Sample period from 1999 (autumn survey) to 2010 (spring survey). Coefficients report marginal 
effects from Heckman probit regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. *, ** and 
*** denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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TABLE 7: Determinants of trust in the ECB – euro area and non-euro area 
member states  
 
euro area
non-euro 
area MS DK, SW, UK
non-euro area 
new MS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis dummy -0.033 0.062** 0.188*** -0.049
(0.030) (0.027) (0.019) (0.059)
Gender: female -0.040*** -0.069*** -0.100*** -0.013
(0.007) (0.020) (0.005) (0.011)
Age 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.014*** 0.015 0.021 0.005
(0.004) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016)
Educational attainment 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.015) (0.013) (0.006)
Employed 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Retired -0.009 -0.031** -0.049* -0.006
(0.006) (0.014) (0.026) (0.009)
Political orientation 0.028*** 0.039** 0.053*** 0.010
(0.006) (0.019) (0.016) (0.037)
Euro area total stock returns 0.002 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.011**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Euro area HICP 0.002 0.067* 0.090*** -0.108
(0.012) (0.035) (0.013) (0.095)
Euro area inflation perceptions -0.001* -0.003 -0.006*** 0.007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008)
Euro area unemployment rate -0.018*** -0.035*** -0.058*** -0.017
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.040)
Total stock return differential 0.002 0.000 -0.008
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
HICP differential 0.021 0.007 0.006**
(0.014) (0.020) (0.003)
Inflation perception differential -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Unemployment rate differential -0.000 -0.045*** 0.001
(0.009) (0.011) (0.003)
General satisfaction with life 0.042*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
Trust in the European Commission 0.603*** 0.626*** 0.571*** 0.714***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.042)
EU membership is a good thing 0.089*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.097***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Expected default frequency -0.003* 0.064** 0.100*** 0.022**
(0.002) (0.030) (0.022) (0.011)
Excess return of bank stocks 0.001 -0.003 -0.007*** 0.007
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009)
AIC 221076 107963 66136 37797
BIC 221197 108019 66154 37830
# of observations 178028 77624 47783 29841
# of censored observations 13929 10713 5584 5129
Log likelihood -110526 -53976 -33066 -18895
chi-squared for comparison test 13.675 11.969 44.838 3.331
p-value for comparison test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.068  
Note: The table reports the determinants of trust in the ECB in the euro area (changing composition) and non-euro 
area member states, estimated using equation (1). “Pre-ins”: Denmark, Sweden, UK, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania; “DK,SW,UK”: Denmark, Sweden, UK; “non euro 
area new MS”: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Sample 
period from 1999 (autumn survey) to 2010 (spring survey). Coefficients report marginal effects from Heckman 
probit regressions. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level. *, ** and *** denote significant at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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DATA APPENDIX TABLE: Coding of variables 
 
Variable Source Coding
Trust in ECB Eurobarometer survey 1 if answered "tend to trust", 0 if answered "tend not to trust", missing if answered "don't 
know"
Gender: female Eurobarometer survey 1 if female, 0 otherwise
Age Eurobarometer survey Age in years
Married Eurobarometer survey 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Educational attainment Eurobarometer survey 1 if education ended before age of 16, 2 if ended between 16 and 19, 3 if ended after 19
Employed Eurobarometer survey 1 if employed, 0 otherwise
Retired Eurobarometer survey 1 if retired, 0 otherwise
Political orientation Eurobarometer survey -1 if relatively left-wing, +1 if relatively right-wing, 0 otherwise
Total stock returns Datastream National total stock returns, 6-month average prior to the survey fieldwork
HICP inflation Eurostat National HICP inflation in percentage points, 6-month average prior to the survey 
fieldwork
Inflation perceptions European Commission 
consumer survey
Balance statistic, difference between the weighted proportion of respondents stating that 
prices have risen over the past twelve months and the weighted proportion of respondents 
stating that prices have fallen or remained unchanged over the same period, 6-month 
average prior to the survey fieldwork
Unemployment rate Eurostat National unemployment in percentage points, 6-month average prior to the survey 
fieldwork
General satisfaction with life Eurobarometer survey 4: very satisfied, 3: fairly; 2: not very; 1: not at all
Trust in the European Commission Eurobarometer survey 1 if answered "tend to trust", 0 if answered "tend not to trust", missing if answered "don't 
know"
EU membership is a good thing Eurobarometer survey -1: bad; 0: good nor bad; 1:good
Expected default frequency Moody's and ECB Median Expected Default Frequency within the financial sector (in percent) 1 year in the 
future, 6-month average prior to the survey fieldwork
Excess return of bank stocks Datastream Difference between national bank stock returns and national total stock returns, 6-month 
average prior to the survey fieldwork
Heard of ECB Eurobarometer survey 1 if answered "yes", 0 if answered "no"
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FIGURE 1. Trust in the ECB by euro area respondents 
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Source: The chart displays the answers by euro area respondents to the Eurobarometer survey question 
“Please tell me if you tend to trust the European Central Bank or tend not to trust it”. Data are in 
percentages. 
 
FIGURE 2. Net trust in European and national institutions by euro area 
respondents 
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Source: The chart displays the answers by euro area respondents to the Eurobarometer survey questions 
“For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.” 
Percentage share of respondents that tend to trust the respective institution minus share of respondents 
that tend not to trust it. 
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FIGURE 3. Trust in the Bank of England 
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Source: The chart displays the answers by respondents to the Bank of England inflation attitudes survey question “Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way 
the Bank of England is doing its job to set interest rates in order to control inflation?” Data are in percentages. 
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